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ALD-219        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 09-4136 
 ___________ 
 
WILLIAM JAMES WALKER, JR.,  
 
                        Appellant 
 
v. 
 
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA;  
PHILADELPHIA COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE; 
DEFENDER ASSOCIATION OF PHILADELPHIA;  
*R. SETH WILLIAMS, ESQ.;  ELLEN GREENLEE;  
DENNIS KELLY; JOHN MADDEN, ESQ. 
NICOLE TAYLOR, ESQ. 
 
*Amended pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2) 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil No. 09-cv-02071) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Mary A. McLaughlin 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
 or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
June 23, 2011 
 Before:  SCIRICA, HARDIMAN AND VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed July 8, 2011) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
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PER CURIAM 
Walker, a prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s dismissal 
of his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).  For the reasons stated below, we will 
summarily affirm.  
I. 
Walker filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 
against the City of Philadelphia, the Philadelphia County District Attorney’s Office, the 
District Attorney, the Defender Association of Philadelphia, and several individual public 
defenders.  He alleged that these defendants conspired to have him plead guilty to 
criminal charges despite being aware of evidence he claims would prove his innocence.  
He sought both monetary relief and the release of all exculpatory evidence. 
The District Court granted Walker’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis and later 
dismissed his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).  
      II. 
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We may 
summarily affirm if the appeal presents no substantial question.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 
I.O.P. 10.6. 
      III.  
 We agree with the District Court’s determination that Walker’s civil rights claim is 
without merit.  To the extent Walker brought his claim pursuant to § 1985(3), the District 
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Court correctly dismissed.  Walker did not allege that any of the defendants’ actions were 
motivated by invidious class-based discriminatory animus, Farber v. City of Paterson, 
440 F.3d 131, 134-43 (3d Cir. 2006), and he failed to state a cognizable claim under any 
other subsection of § 1985.  
 To the extent Walker sought relief under § 1983, dismissal was likewise correct as 
none of the defendants is liable under that provision.  The City of Philadelphia is not 
subject to liability in a civil rights action absent a showing that unlawful actions were 
taken as a result of an approved municipal or governmental custom.  Monell v. New York 
Dep’t of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978).  The District Attorney’s Office and 
the District Attorney himself have absolute immunity from liability for actions related to 
their official duties.  Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 410 (1976).  The Defender 
Association of Philadelphia and the individual public defenders are not liable under § 
1983.  See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981) (public defenders not liable 
because they were not acting under color of state law).   
 We also agree with the District Court that Walker’s conspiracy claim does not 
appear to be based in fact, but merely upon his own suspicion and speculation.  Young v. 
Kann, 926 F.2d 1396, 1405 n.16 (3d Cir. 1991).    
 Accordingly, the District Court did not err in dismissing his complaint as legally 
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frivolous.
1
  Id.  We are satisfied that any amendment to Walker’s Complaint would have 
been futile, and thus the District Court properly dismissed without leave to amend.  See 
Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002). As the appeal 
presents no substantial question, we will summarily affirm the judgment below.  See 3d 
Cir. L.A.R. 27.4 and 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10. 
                                              
1
 To the extent Walker sought to invalidate his state convictions, the remedy was 
available only through habeas corpus proceedings. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 
486-87 (1994). 
